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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Deepwater offshore drilling presents a clash of competing interests 
that raises legal questions of some novelty.  The government and the 
public possess a significant interest in obtaining access to geological 
information about potential drilling sites, and the proposed techniques for 
exploiting the accompanying mineral rights, in order to maintain safety, 
health, and the environment.1  On the other hand, companies engaged in 
offshore drilling possess a strong and legitimate interest in protecting 
                                                
∗ Michael A. Greene, S.B., Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Juris Doctor 
Candidate, Boston College Law School, May 2012.  The Author thanks Professor Daniel 
Lyons of Boston College Law School for valuable guidance in this undertaking.  The 
Author expresses his gratitude to Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater of Boston College Law 
School for suggesting this fruitful topic of investigation, and to Professor Richard Albert 
of Boston College Law School for his comments on an early draft. The Author would 
also like to thank Eric French and Alana Van der Mude for their assistance in researching 
preliminary information. 
 
1 See generally The Big Picture: Why Is It So Hard to Stop the Oil Gusher, and Why Was 
Such Extreme Deepwater Drilling Allowed in the First Place?, WASHINGTON’S BLOG 
(May 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2010/05/big-picture-why-was-
deepwater-drilling.html [hereinafter The Big Picture] (showing that BP never disclosed 
the “detailed geological information, maps and drawings” of its drill site to the federal 
government, which might have prevented the drilling before it began). 
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proprietary information, which is intrinsic to their ability to compete.2  For 
example, disclosure of valuable information regarding a potential offshore 
oil reservoir could entice competitors to drill and deplete the same 
reservoir from a slightly removed location, resulting in the loss of billions 
of dollars of revenue. 
 
[2] The events of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling and 
blowout response highlight the risks to public safety, health, and the 
environment of nondisclosure of industry data.3  Reports suggest that 
responsible parties withheld critical information regarding the structure of 
the ocean floor at the Deepwater Horizon drilling site from regulating 
agencies.4  Furthermore, past spill response drills have led federal officials 
to complain of inadequate industry disclosure to government 
representatives, motivated in part by industry’s desire to protect 
                                                
2 See Nicolas Loris, Initial Response to the Oil Spill Commission Report, FOUNDRY (Jan. 
11, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/11/initial-response-to-the-oil-spill-
commission-report/; see also Elana Schor, Ingredients of Controversial Dispersants Used 
on Gulf Spill Are Secrets No More, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/09/09greenwire-ingredients-of-controversial-
dispersants-used-42891.html. 
 
3 See, e.g., Schor, supra note 2; see also Matthew Mosk et al., After Oil Rig Blast, BP 
Refused to Share Underwater Spill Footage, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/bp-oil-spill-oil-rig-blast-bp-refused/story?id=10624972 
&page=1; Transocean Says BP Withholding Information, UPI.COM (Apr. 20, 2010, 2:34 
PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2010/08/20/Transocean-
says-BP-withholding-information/UPI-2534128232 9259/; Dan Zak, As Oil Spread, Did 
BP Battle to Contain the Media?, WASH. POST (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/03/AR201006030 
0848.html.   
 
4 Evidence shows the geologic structure of deepwater petroleum sites in the Gulf of 
Mexico to be comprised of porous and tectonically active salt sheets – a critical 
parameter to determining effective methods of capping the blowout – yet reports suggest 
BP did not provide regulating agencies with such information.  The Big Picture, supra 
note 1; Top Expert: Geology Is “Fractured”, Relief Wells May Fail … BP is Using a 
“Cloak of Silence”, Refusing to Share Even Basic Data with the Government, 
WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Aug. 19, 2010), http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/ 
2010/08/top-oil-expert-geology-is-fractured-bp.html. 
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proprietary information.5  In addition to its contribution to problems in the 
Gulf, inadequate information sharing has also hamstrung federal 
regulators tasked with overseeing offshore drilling operations in Alaska.6 
  
[3] This Article will explore whether the law may require the 
disclosure of adequate proprietary information to enable effective 
regulation.  Part II will discuss the settled law regarding the property 
status of trade secrets, the regulatory takings doctrine, the applicability of 
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution to proprietary data, 
and the exactions doctrine.  Part III will explore the validity of the 
mandatory submission of proprietary health, safety, and environmental 
data to government regulators, with the guarantee that such data will be 
kept secret from competitors and the public.  Part IV will then explore the 
validity of regulation mandating public disclosure of such proprietary 
information, and will discuss the implications for regulation of deepwater 
drilling. Finally, Part V will discuss the implications of the exactions 
doctrine for the validity of regulation requiring public disclosure of 
proprietary health, safety, and environmental data, as viewed through the 
lens of land use. 
 
II.  TAKINGS CLAUSE PROTECTION FOR PROPRIETARY DATA 
 
A.  Trade Secrets as Property Rights 
 
[4] The threshold question in any evaluation of the constitutionality of 
mandatory disclosure of trade secret information is whether that 
                                                
5 John Solomon & Aaron Mehta, Training Exercises Showed Gaps in Government 
Preparedness Before BP Oil Spill, CENT. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 12, 2010, 1:34 AM), 
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/05/11/2676/training-exercises-showed-gaps-
government-preparedness-bp-oil-spill. 
 
6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-276, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN THE NORTH 
ALEUTIAN BASIN (2010) (decrying selective sharing of information on a need-to-know 
basis within the MMS agency in the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf region as preventing 
agency officials from obtaining access to the very reports from which they were required 
to produce environmental impact assessments). 
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information constitutes property.7  Trade secret protection was originally a 
common law doctrine with vague definitional boundaries, and much of 
that common law nature persists today.8  For example, trade secret 
protection requires no governmental registration, one of its principal 
attractions compared to other types of intellectual property.9  In its 1984 
decision of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the United States Supreme 
Court granted recognition to trade secrets as property for Takings Clause 
purposes.10   
 
[5] Mindful of precedent mandating that property interests must stem 
from a source independent of the Constitution, such as state law, the Court 
held trade secrets recognized as property by relevant state law will be 
afforded constitutional protection.11  Thus, the starting point when 
evaluating the validity of potential regulation of offshore oil drilling is 
                                                
7 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-03 (1984).  See generally Philip 
Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 
8 See Julie Piper, I Have A Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to 
Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 360-64 (2008); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade 
Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
1425, 1432-33 & nn.41-42 (2009); David V. Radack, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
TMS (Jan. 2006), http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-0601.html.  
See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 
9 See Rowe, supra note 8, at 1432.  
 
10 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. 
 
11 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, 1003-04; Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (“‘Property interests . . . are not created by the 
Constitution.  Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” (quoting 
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972))); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as 
opposed to the several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define 
‘property’ in the first instance.”); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 114-15 
(3d Cir. 1981) (holding property rights must be established by some state law because 
“‘[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulable voice 
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
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analyzing each regulated company’s trade secret protection as granted 
under state law.12  If the relevant state provides no trade secret protection 
for the type of health, safety, and environmental data at issue, further 
takings analysis is unnecessary.13   
 
[6] Trade secrets are protected in every state in one form or another.14  
The vast majority of states – governing the overwhelming majority of 
United States corporations – have enacted the Uniform Trade Secret Act 
(“UTSA”), which clearly defines the types of proprietary data at issue as 
protectable trade secrets.15  Among states that have not enacted the UTSA, 
Texas is a particularly interesting example, both because of its proximity 
to the Gulf of Mexico and because federal agencies have held the Texas 
corporation BP Exploration & Production, Inc. (“BP E&P”) a Responsible 
Party for the Deepwater Horizon cleanup.16  Though the Texas legislature 
                                                
12 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001. 
 
13 See id. at 1001, 1014.   
 
14 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 35 (5th ed. 2010). 
 
15 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) (defining a trade secret as 
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”); 
MERGES, supra note 14, at 36 (stating that forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted the UTSA).  Note that Delaware, by far the most popular legal domicile for 
corporations, has adopted the UTSA.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 
(2011); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of 
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 190, 195-96 & 196 nn.30-
31 (2011) (“A majority of publicly traded companies and sixty percent of the Fortune 
tune [sic] 500 are incorporated in Delaware.  No other state even approaches Delaware’s 
market share.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 
16 Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning (Pursuant to 15 C.F.R. Section 
990.44) – Discharge of Oil from the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 
and the Subsea Macondo Well Into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA & NAT’L RES. TRS.  (Apr. 
20, 2010), http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/deepwater_horizon/pdf/Deepwater_ 
Horizon_Final_NOI.pdf (holding BP Exploration & Production Inc. a responsible party 
for purposes of the Deepwater Horizon cleanup); Letter from Susan Combs, Tex. 
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has spurned the UTSA, Texas courts nonetheless apply the Restatement of 
Torts definition of trade secrets, which clearly defines confidential 
competitive data as a trade secret.17  Thus, like Monsanto’s proprietary 
health, safety and environmental data, a deepwater oil company’s 
proprietary geological health, safety, and environmental data would likely 
be protected by state law under either the UTSA or the Restatement 
definition of trade secret, and are further protected by the Takings Clause 
of the United States Constitution.18 
 
B.  Takings and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine 
 
[7] Where an act of government conveys title to an interest in property 
from the owner to the public, the Takings Clause states that the owner 
must receive “just compensation.”19  This is the ordinary takings doctrine, 
which applies whether the interest conveyed is full title or merely an 
easement.20  By contrast, where regulation does not convey an interest but 
                                                
Comptroller, to State of Tex., filing no. 800338839 (filed May 6, 2004), available at 
https://ourcpa.cpa.state.tx.us/coa/servlet/cpa.app.coa.CoaLetter (certifying BP 
Exploration & Production as incorporated in the State of Texas and in good standing as 
of November 22, 2010); see Ryan C. Hudson et al., State Law IP Litigation Issues, 45 
ADVOCATE (Texas) 110, 110 (2008) (“Texas trade secret law substantially overlaps – but 
does not entirely duplicate – the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . .”). 
 
17 See Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958) (adopting the 
Restatement definition of trade secrets); Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Wella 
Corp., No. 03-04-00623-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8841, at *50 n.19 (Oct. 11, 2006) 
(“Texas courts continue to follow the definition of trade secrets, as well as the six factors 
used to identify a trade secret, set forth in section 757 of the original Restatement of Torts 
. . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (defining a trade 
secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it,” and which is in fact secret); Hudson, supra note 
16, at 110-11.   
 
18 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). 
 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the taking of “private property . . . for public use, 
without just compensation”). 
 
20 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“Without question, had 
the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land . . . for public use, rather 
than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, 
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merely restricts the use an owner may make of his or her property, courts 
apply the regulatory takings doctrine.21 
 
[8] The regulatory takings doctrine provides the basis for determining 
the validity of land-use regulations using the three famous Penn Central 
factors: (i) “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[;]” (ii) 
interference with reasonable “investment backed expectations[;]” and (iii) 
“the character of the governmental action.”22  Assumed in such cases is 
that government must occasionally diminish the value of private property 
in furthering the public interest.23  But where such reductions are so severe 
as to be tantamount to a direct appropriation or an ouster, the regulatory 
takings doctrine acts “to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”24 
 
[9] Trade secrets protected under state law are also protected under the 
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, though they are not 
land.25  Public disclosure of a trade secret constitutes the destruction of its 
                                                
a taking would have occurred.”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 
(1987) (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their 
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access 
to the beach . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”); see also Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding a regulation 
requiring apartment buildings to allow the installation of television cable boxes a taking 
and invalid on its face). 
 
21 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pa. Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 
22 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005. 
 
23 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law.”). 
 
24 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“[G]overnment regulation of private property may, in 
some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or 
ouster . . . such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 
25 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. 
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owner’s entire property interest in that trade secret, and thus forced 
disclosure – far beyond being a mere use restriction upon that property – 
would seem to implicate the ordinary takings doctrine.26  Nonetheless, the 
United States Supreme Court in Monsanto evaluated regulations requiring 
such public disclosure within the regulatory takings framework, much as it 
has evaluated the validity of restrictions upon the use of land.27 
 
C.  Exactions Doctrine 
 
[10] Where government entities condition the grant of a requested 
government permit or benefit upon the conveyance of a private property 
right to the public, the exactions doctrine is implicated.28  The purpose of 
the exactions doctrine is to prevent the government from exploiting an 
individual’s chance need for a government permit to unfairly accomplish 
an uncompensated condemnation of property.29 
 
1.  Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and the Essential Nexus 
 
[11] In its landmark 1987 decision in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, the United States Supreme Court first introduced the 
“essential nexus” requirement when evaluating exactions.30  In Nollan, the 
California Coastal Commission conditioned the approval of a 
homeowner’s building permit petition upon the homeowner allowing the 
                                                
26 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (providing a definitional requirement that 
trade secrets be subject to reasonable attempts to maintain secrecy); Monsanto, 467 U.S. 
at 1002 (“If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation 
to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the 
secret, his property right is extinguished.”). 
 
27 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005, 1016; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 
28 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1994); see also Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
 
29 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-84; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 
30 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
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public a lateral easement across its beachfront property, to connect one 
public beach with another.31   The Commission based its exaction upon a 
finding that the proposed building plan would inhibit the public’s view 
and awareness of the public beach from the street, pursuant to a California 
statute authorizing the restricting of building projects that “have an 
adverse impact on public access to the sea.”32  The state Superior Court 
nullified the Commission’s action, finding that the Commission lacked 
statutory authority for its actions.33  The California Court of Appeal, 
however, reversed the Superior Court’s statutory interpretation, upholding 
the Commission’s authority to condition its grant of the building permit 
and finding no constitutional infirmity in such action.34   
 
[12] The United States Supreme Court reversed the California courts, 
finding the Commission’s exaction an unconstitutional exercise of 
government authority.35  In so doing, the Court introduced the exactions 
doctrine.36  Put succinctly, the Court ruled that to be valid an exaction 
must function as a substitute for a valid prohibition.37  This imposes two 
conditions: first, the government must have had the ability to 
constitutionally prohibit the proposed building plan outright, due to the 
proposed building plan’s impact.38  Second, the exaction the government 
requires must accomplish the same purpose as the prohibition for which it 
substitutes, or put another way, must be designed to mitigate the same 
                                                
31 Id. at 828. 
 
32 Id. at 829. 
 
33 See id. (noting the Superior Court interpreted the statute in part to avoid difficult issues 
of constitutionality, which turned out to be quite prescient).   
 
34 Id. at 830-31. 
 
35 See id. at 841-42. 
 
36 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837, 848. 
 
37 See id. at 837. 
 
38 See id at 836-37.  
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impacts of the building proposal that the prohibition would address.39  
This is the “essential nexus” requirement.40 
 
[13] In the Nollans’ case, the Commission possessed the constitutional 
authority to deny the building permit petition proposal outright, or so the 
Court assumed, in order to protect the view of the ocean for passersby on 
the street.41  The second prong, however, is where the Commission’s 
exaction failed.42  The Court stated that an exaction of a viewing spot on 
the Nollans’ property to the public beach would have been valid, 
preserving the view of and access to the beach from the street.43  It also 
intimated that an easement traversing the property from the street to the 
beach may not have suffered the same infirmity as the lateral easement.44  
In requiring a lateral easement across the Nollans’ property, however, the 
exaction failed to accomplish the same purpose as a prohibition on 
building.45  In short, the exaction failed to function as a substitute for a 
prohibition.46 
                                                
39 See id. at 836-37.  
 
40 See id. at 837.  
 
41 See id. at 835-36 (“The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are 
protecting the public’s ability to see the beach . . . .  We assume, without deciding, that 
this is so-in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the 
Nollans their permit outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede these 
purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their 
property as to constitute a taking.”). 
 
42 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839. 
 
43 See id. at 836 (“[T]he condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the 
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with 
whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.”). 
 
44 See id. at 836, 838, 840 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that 
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces 
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.”). 
 
45 See id.  
 
46 See id. at 836-37. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 4 
 11 
2.  Dolan v. City of Tigard and Rough Proportionality 
 
[14] The Supreme Court further developed the exactions doctrine in its 
1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.47  In Dolan, a hardware store 
owner petitioned the city for a building permit to expand her store, which 
would double the size of the store and pave a parking lot.48  Her property 
was adjacent to a creek, and part of her property was within the creek’s 
100-year floodplain.49  The City Planning Commission conditioned its 
approval of Dolan’s petition upon the dedication of the floodplain portion 
of her property for an improved storm drainage system, and a further 
dedication to the public of a strip of adjacent land for a bicycle and 
pedestrian passageway.50  The Commission cited a finding of increased 
traffic congestion due to the proposed development, as well as increased 
burden on the creek’s ability to handle storm water runoff resulting from 
the additional proposed water-resistant paved surfaces.51  Thus, the 
Commission followed the teachings of the Court in Nollan, finding the 
essential nexus between the impacts of the proposed building and the 
exacted dedication designed to address the traffic and runoff problems.52  
Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Commission’s action under Nollan.53 
 
                                                
47 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 
48 See id. at 379. 
 
49 See id.  See generally 18 C.F.R. § 1304.412 (2009) (“100-year floodplain means that 
area inundated by the one percent annual chance (or 100-year) flood.”); ROBERT R. 
HOLMES, JR. & KAREN DINICOLA, 100-YEAR FLOOD-IT’S ALL ABOUT CHANCE: U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY GENERAL INFORMATION PRODUCT 106 (2010), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106A (defining a 100-year floodplain as an area inundated by the 
one percent annual chance flood, the so-called “100-year flood”).   
 
50 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380. 
 
51 Id. at 381-82. 
 
52 See id. at 381-83, 387; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). 
 
53 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
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[15] The United States Supreme Court, nonetheless, struck down the 
Commission’s actions as unconstitutional.54  The Court stated the relation 
that the exacted dedication must bear to the impacts of the proposed 
development must constitute not only a nexus, but be related “both in 
nature and extent.”55  The Court clarified that “[n]o precise mathematical 
calculation is required[,]” but there must be an individualized showing of 
rough proportionality.56  In the case at bar, the Commission had found that 
the burdens of the proposed development and the exaction imposed were 
related, but had made no showing as to the degree of burden proposed nor 
the degree of relief afforded by the exacted remedy.57 
 
[16] Thus, in Dolan the Supreme Court clarified its exactions 
jurisprudence, specifying that for exactions to be valid the exacted 
dedication to the public must not only function as a substitute for 
prohibiting the proposed development, but its remedial effect must be 
“roughly proportional” to the impact of the proposed development.58 
 
3.  Purely Regulatory Versus Adjudicatory Action 
 
[17] It is potentially significant that both the Nollan and the Dolan 
decisions involved the adjudicatory action of government agencies, rather 
than pure legislative rulemaking.59  Both cases involved exactions 
imposed by city commissions in individually adjudicating a petition for a 
building permit.60  Justice Rehnquist emphasized this adjudicatory nature 
                                                
54 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83, 396. 
 
55 Id. at 391. 
 
56 Id.  
 
57 Id. at 395-96. 
 
58 Id. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
 
59 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29; Mark Fenster, Regulating 
Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Insitutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 729, 729, 731, 741 (2007). 
 
60 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29. 
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in his opinion for the Court in Dolan.61  Justice Rehnquist distinguished 
land-use regulations judged under the regulatory takings doctrine that are 
“essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of [a] 
city[,]” from the individualized determinations and dedications the city 
commissions exacted in Nollan and Dolan.62  The Court clearly turned a 
mistrustful eye toward individualized exactions as being inherently more 
suspect of government usurpation, and requiring greater judicial 
scrutiny.63   
 
4.  Application of Exactions Doctrine to Trade Secrets 
 
[18] The distinction between adjudicatory and purely legislative actions 
in the exactions analysis is of paramount importance to evaluating the 
application of the exactions doctrine to deepwater drilling regulation.  The 
distinction between regulation of land use versus non-land use also is 
significant.  Courts have not yet addressed whether an exaction of trade 
secrets may be controlled by the exactions doctrine.64  As such, the 
legality of mandatory disclosure of proprietary data will be analyzed in 
Parts III and IV through the regulatory takings framework as expounded in 
                                                
61 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 
62 Id.  
 
63 See id. at 387 (describing the Coastal Commission action in Nollan as “gimmickry”); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (“We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective 
[i.e., the substantial advancing of a legitimate state interest] where the actual conveyance 
of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context 
there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, 
rather than the stated police-power objective.”); see also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San 
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (“The ‘sine qua non’ for application of 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the ‘discretionary deployment of the police power’ in ‘the 
imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases.’”) (citation omitted); Action 
Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Both 
the United States and California Supreme Courts have explained the two part 
Nollan/Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the 
case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable 
legislative general zoning decisions.”). 
 
64 See, e.g., Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-1005.  
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the Monsanto decision. This Article will return to the exactions doctrine 
and viewing the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets through the land use 
lens in Part V. 
 
III.  LEGALITY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
 
[19] Where statutes or regulations expressly grant prohibitions of public 
disclosure, the government is clearly within its right to demand health, 
safety, and environmental data from private industry, notwithstanding the 
proprietary nature of that information.65  First principles of trade secret 
doctrine as well as judicial opinion uphold the validity of such mandatory 
submission requirements.66  Although industry interests have argued that 
even confidential submission of trade secrets to government diminishes 
their value and risks disclosure through inadvertent mistake or subsequent 
judicial proceedings, courts have rightfully rejected such arguments.67 
 
A.  First Principles of Trade Secrets Law 
 
[20] According to first principles of trade secret doctrine, disclosure of 
proprietary information to governmental agencies does not diminish the 
property interests of the trade secret holders, provided the agency assures 
confidentiality.68  The very definition of trade secret is information that 
affords its holder an economic advantage over competitors, and regarding 
which its holder undertakes reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure to 
competitors.69  Because a trade secret’s only legally cognizable value is 
                                                
65 See infra Parts III.B, IV. 
 
66 See infra Part III.A-B.  
 
67 See, e.g., FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 876, 877, 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc); Cont’l 
Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975).   
 
68 See Owens-Corning, 626 F.2d at 972 n.12. 
 
69 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 
757 cmt. b (1939).  The Restatement of Torts, widely accepted before the enactment of 
the UTSA, defines trade secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to 
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it,” and which is in fact 
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the advantage it affords over competitors, sharing trade secret information 
confidentially with the government – a non-competitor – does not impinge 
upon the trade secret holder’s competitive advantage and thus does not 
reduce the property’s value.70  Furthermore, a trade secret holder’s right to 
exclude, perhaps the essential property right, is severely circumscribed.71  
A cause of action accrues to a trade secret holder only through 
misappropriation by wrongdoing; obtainment of trade secret information 
by innocent means is non-actionable.72  Because the right to exclude 
applies only to misappropriation, the proprietary right in trade secrets is a 
limited one, and governmental use of trade secrets, by definition not 
misappropriation, infringes no rights of the property holder.73 
                                                
secret.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added); see 
MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 35-36.  Similarly, the UTSA, enacted in the 
overwhelming majority of states, defines trade secrets as information that “derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to . . . 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”  UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) (emphasis added). 
 
70 See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 115 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding the 
Restatement of Torts § 757 definition of trade secret unavailing for purposes of 
establishing a property right in confidential data as against internal agency use, because 
§ 757 deals only with liability for public disclosure of trade secrets); see also UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b; Mark Q. Connelly, 
Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures 
of Business Data, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 207, 251 n.210 (noting that a trade secret’s value is 
harmed only through public disclosure and where a competitor will obtain that trade 
secret information). 
 
71 See Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (“In this case, we hold that 
the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property 
right, falls within [the] category of interests that the Government cannot take without 
compensation.”) (footnotes omitted); Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal 
right to exclude others from enjoying it.”). 
 
72 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2), 2, 3 (providing entitlement to relief only for 
misappropriation); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757, 758(a) (providing trade secret 
liability only for wrongdoing); MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 37 (explaining that trade 
secret liability only accrues for information acquired wrongfully). 
 
73 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2), 2, 3; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757, 758(a); 
see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1010-11 (1984) (stating that there 
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B. Judicial Rulings 
 
[21] Courts have given a frosty reception to industry arguments that 
confidential disclosures to the government compromise property 
interests.74  Industry has argued that disclosure to regulatory agencies 
threatens its possessory interests in trade secrets, either through the very 
existence of the information outside industry control, or because such 
secrets could be revealed to the public through subsequent judicial or 
congressional proceedings.75  Nevertheless, courts have universally 
rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory submission of trade secrets 
to regulatory agencies where confidentiality is maintained.76 
                                                
is no recognition of frustration of investment-backed expectations except where data is 
disclosed to the public). 
 
74 See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179 & n.16 (D. 
Me. 2004) (“This Court does not credit PCMA’s fear that the disclosure protections of 
[the state statute] are illusory because the information could be revealed in a subsequent 
judicial proceeding.”); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11 (stating that there is no cognizance 
of frustration of investment-backed expectations except where data is disclosed to the 
public). 
 
75 See FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 972 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(rejecting contentions that the presence of trade secrets outside a corporation’s control 
lessened their value and amounted to a taking); Pharm. Care, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 179 
n.16; James T. Halverson, An Analysis of the Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Reporting 
Problem: The Government’s Need to Know Versus the Private Company’s Need to 
Protect the Confidentiality of Its Sensitive Business Information, 27TH INST. ON OIL & 
GAS L. 119, 134-35 (1976) (arguing lack of reliable confidentiality where proprietary 
information was released by the agency to a congressional subcommittee). 
 
76 See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 288, 300 (1965) (enforcing an agency subpoena 
duces tecum of confidential, competitively sensitive business information); Owens-
Corning, 626 F.2d at 968 (enforcing an agency order mandating the submission of 
confidential business information, including trade secrets); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 
862, 876, 877, 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (enforcing administrative subpoenas 
duces tecum of highly sensitive proprietary natural gas reserves data); Cont’l Oil Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding an agency order 
requiring the submission of detailed proprietary natural gas sales information); see also 
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002, 1010-11 (recognizing takings argument only where agency 
disclosed data to public or competitors); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45 (1st 
Cir. 2002) (distinguishing unconstitutional Massachusetts statute mandating public 
disclosure of secret cigarette ingredients from Texas statute mandating confidential 
submission to state agency); Chevron v. Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 115 (3d 
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[22] For example, in FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. the 
District of Columbia Circuit enforced a Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) order requiring submission of documents containing highly 
confidential trade secrets.77  In Owens-Corning, as part of a nonpublic 
antitrust investigation of the insulation industry, the FTC issued subpoenas 
duces tecum to Owens-Corning and other corporations to produce certain 
documents.78  Owens-Corning refused to comply on the grounds that the 
documents contained trade secrets, including detailed information on 
costs, sales, customers, business plans, and secret processes.79   
Owens-Corning argued that inadequate safeguards of confidentiality and 
the increased possibility of disclosure due to the documents’ presence 
beyond the company’s exclusive control lessened the trade secrets’ value, 
amounting to a taking.80  The court rejected these arguments as “devoid of 
                                                
Cir. 1981) (“[The Restatement definition of trade secrets] affords no help since it deals 
with liability for disclosure of trade secrets without a privilege to do so.  EPA does not 
propose disclosure.”); Pharm. Care, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 179 n.16; Dep’t of Natural Res. v. 
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 144 (Alaska 1991) (distinguishing public 
disclosure from mandatory reporting to the state); cf. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 651 F.2d 
506, 507 (7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to enjoin the FTC from disclosing to state attorneys 
general its price fixing investigatory files containing proprietary business information 
because no public disclosure or commercial use of secrets was contemplated); Ashland 
Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (refusing to enjoin the FTC from 
transferring to a congressional subcommittee highly competitive trade secret natural gas 
reserves estimates submitted to the Commission by plaintiff, because submission to 
Congress is not making public).  Compare Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 563 F.2d 191, 194-95, 202 (5th Cir. 1977) (sustaining an agency order 
requiring natural gas producers to submit detailed confidential information concerning 
exploration and development-related expenditures where the agency reasonably 
considered the burden on the regulated industry and the agency need for the data), with 
Union Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1037, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(rejecting an order requiring natural gas producers to submit detailed proprietary data on 
natural gas reserves because the agency failed to consider the burden on the regulated 
industry in more than a summary or cursory manner). 
 
77 Owens-Corning, 626 F.2d at 968-69. 
 
78 Id.  
 
79 Id. at 969 n.1. 
 
80 See id. at 971-72 & n.12. 
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any merit,” stating that agency use of the information is not a public 
disclosure nor does it interfere with Owens-Corning’s ability to use its 
trade secrets, and ordered compliance with the FTC subpoena.81 
 
IV.  LEGALITY OF MANDATORY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
 
A.  Information “Voluntarily” Submitted 
 
[23] In evaluating mandatory public disclosure, some courts afford 
great weight to industry’s voluntary submission of trade secrets to 
agencies before filing suit, which diminishes or even extinguishes 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.82  The most well-known 
instance of forced public disclosure is probably in the context of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),83 and the 
Supreme Court’s Monsanto decision, in which the Court ruled for the first 
time that proprietary information constitutes property protected by the 
Takings Clause.84  Monsanto challenged Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) regulations under FIFRA that required pesticide 
manufacturers to provide health, safety, and environmental data to register 
pesticides with the EPA.85  Numerous amendments to FIFRA were made 
over the years: before 1972, the statute contained no express promise of 
confidentiality of submitted information; the 1972 amended statute 
expressly guaranteed confidentiality of proprietary data; and the 1978 
amendments provided that proprietary data would be used to evaluate 
competitors’ registration applications and revealed to the public after a 
ten-year confidentiality period.86  Monsanto argued that it had invested 
millions of dollars in producing the registration data, and public disclosure 
                                                
81 Id. at 968, 972 n.12. 
 
82 See, e.g., Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006-10; Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 
37-38 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 
83 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006). 
 
84 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. 
 
85 Id. at 998. 
 
86 Id. at 991-96. 
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and use in competitors’ registrations granted “[its] competitors a free 
ride.”87 
 
[24] The Court ruled that the EPA’s disclosure of data submitted after 
1978 or before 1972 does not constitute a taking, because Monsanto had 
notice of the manner in which the EPA would use and disclose any data.88   
Monsanto, faced with the choice of either submitting the data or foregoing 
a license to market its pesticides, had voluntarily chosen to submit its 
data.89  Monsanto thus had no reasonable investment-backed expectation 
that its trade secrets submitted during these periods would remain secret 
and retain their value.90  The Court further found the investment-backed 
expectations to so overwhelm the other Penn Central factors as to be 
dispositive, and thus no taking had occurred.91  The Court held that this 
regulatory scheme was not an unconstitutional condition on Monsanto’s 
right to do business, “for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear 
in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized 
community.’”92  Nevertheless, public disclosure of data submitted between 
1972 and 1978 would constitute a taking due to the 1972 FIFRA’s express 
statutory promise of confidentiality, which created so strong a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation as to again dispose of the takings question 
without resort to the other Penn Central factors.93 
 
[25] Court precedent is thus clear that if licensing regulations require 
offshore drilling companies submit health, safety and environmental data 
                                                
87 Id. at 999. 
 
88 See id. at 1006-09. 
 
89 See id. 
 
90 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006-09; see also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373-
74 (7th Cir. 1953) (discussing how actual secrecy is a definitional aspect of trade secrets). 
 
91 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06. 
 
92 Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 
93 See id. at 1005-06, 1010-12.   
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 4 
 20 
and offer no guarantee of confidentiality, companies that voluntarily 
submit proprietary data have no claim of a taking or of an unconstitutional 
condition.94 
 
B.  Effectiveness of Preemptive Lawsuits Before Disclosure 
 
[26] Whereas the takings issue is easily disposed of when a company 
discloses its trade secrets first and then files suit, the question of a 
company filing suit ex ante is considerably more difficult to answer.95  
This distinction hinges upon the company’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; where the company has voluntarily submitted its proprietary 
information in the absence of an express promise of confidentiality, it has 
severely compromised its investment-backed expectations of that 
information’s competitive value.96 
 
[27] Early cases appear to support the government’s right to force 
public disclosure.  In the 1919 decision of Corn Products Refining Co. v. 
Eddy, the Supreme Court held that a table syrup manufacturer could be 
required by state law to publicly reveal the names and percentages of each 
ingredient used in its secret syrup recipe without violating the Takings 
Clause.97  The Court held it “too plain for argument that a manufacturer  
                                                
94 See id. at 1006-07; see also Tri-Bio Lab., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 139-41 
(3d Cir. 1987) (finding a taking due to reasonable investment-backed expectations based 
on an express regulatory guarantee of confidentiality); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 
F.2d 104, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding there was no taking of submitted data because 
there were no reasonable investment-backed expectations in the absence of an express 
statutory or regulatory promise of confidentiality); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d Cir. 1977) (“A voluntary submission 
of information by an applicant seeking the economic advantages of a license can hardly 
be called a taking.”); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 
145 (Alaska 1991) (holding the public disclosure of valuable oil well data voluntarily 
submitted was not a taking); N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 502 
N.W.2d 240, 247 (N.D. 1993) (holding the public disclosure of trade secret data 
voluntarily submitted was not a taking). 
 
95 See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 37-39 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 
96 See id.  
 
97 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919). 
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. . . has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving the purchaser 
fair information of what is being sold.”98  The Court reaffirmed its 
decision in the 1937 case National Fertilizer Association v. Bradley, 
upholding a fertilizer labeling statute.99  
 
[28] In Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, a case particularly 
relevant to offshore drilling regulation, the Fifth Circuit grappled with a 
Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) order requiring offshore natural gas 
producers to publicly disclose volume and location data of their wells.100  
In Pennzoil, drilling companies argued that a major purpose of leasing 
tracts of ocean land from the federal government is to discover clues to the 
potential productivity of nearby tracts for purposes of future leases, and 
that disclosure of such data would enable competitors to free ride on 
another’s investment.101  The court found against the FPC for its lack of 
“thoughtful consideration” and apparent cavalier attitude towards stripping 
industry of its trade secrets.102  Yet the court implied that upon proper 
agency consideration and demonstration of public necessity, such 
regulation is valid – even when challenged ex ante.103 
 
[29] At the other end of the spectrum, the First Circuit in its 2002 Philip 
Morris, Inc. v. Reilly decision ruled that a state law requiring tobacco 
companies to disclose publicly all ingredients in their cigarettes, a 
supremely valuable trade secret, was an unconstitutional taking of 
property without compensation.104  The court distinguished Corn Products 
                                                
98 Id. at 431.  
 
99 Nat’l Fertilizer Ass’n, Inc. v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178, 182 (1937). 
 
100 Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 626, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 
101 Id. at 629. 
 
102 Id. at 632 (detailing three factors the FPC must consider in determining whether such 
information should be publicly disclosed). 
 
103 See id.; see also Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 563 F.2d 191, 205 
(5th Cir. 1977) (reaching a decision similar to the holding in Pennzoil regarding the same 
FPC order). 
 
104 See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002).  
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by a narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s “fair information” language, 
finding that fair information under the labeling statute in Corn Products 
encompasses full disclosure of all ingredients due to that statute’s purpose 
of preventing consumer deception, whereas fair information for purposes 
of a statute directed to health and safety means something short of 
disclosure of all additives.105  The court also distinguished Monsanto, in 
which public disclosure of data submitted before 1972 or after 1978 did 
not constitute a taking, because Monsanto had voluntarily submitted its 
trade secrets without a reasonable expectation of confidentiality – 
destroying its proprietary interest in the process – whereas Philip Morris 
filed suit before submitting.106  The distinction between suit ex post and ex 
ante carries a compelling logic: the investment-backed expectation 
calculus is undoubtedly altered by the voluntary submission of proprietary 
information without a guarantee of confidentiality.107 
                                                
105 See id. at 40. 
 
106 See id. at 37-38. 
 
107 See id.; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (“[A] voluntary 
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a 
registration can hardly be called a taking.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Reg. 
Comm’n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d. Cir. 1977).  Although this timing distinction may seem 
unfair – governmental usurpation of power is valid as applied to the naïve, who submit 
proprietary data before filing suit – this result may merely illustrate the proper 
importance of process.  See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 38.  On the other hand, the 
Monsanto and Westinghouse courts properly ruled only on the narrow grounds of the 
cases before them; they did not attempt, nor should they be read, to definitively announce 
a rule regarding investment-backed expectations outside of that narrow class.  See 
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007; KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 38 (1930) 
(“[T]he court can decide only the particular dispute before it; . . . all that is said is to be 
read with eyes on that dispute. . . . Look to your own discussion, look to any argument. 
You know where you would go. You reach, at random if hurried, more carefully if not, 
for a foundation, for a major premise. But never for itself. Its interest lies in leading to the 
conclusion you are headed for. You shape its words, its content, to an end decreed. More, 
with your mind upon your object you use words, you bring in illustrations, you deploy 
and advance and concentrate again. When you have done, you have said much you did 
not mean. You did not mean, that is, except in reference to your point. You have brought 
generalization after generalization up, and discharged it at your goal; all, in the heat of 
argument, were over-stated. None would you stand to, if your opponent should urge them 
to another issue. So with the judge. Nay, more so with the judge.”) (emphasis in 
original).  Reading too much into the narrow grounds cited might be misguided, 
especially given the broad implications of some of the Monsanto and Corn Products 
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C. Implications for Potential Regulation  
of Deepwater Offshore Drilling 
 
[30] Philip Morris presents an important consideration for potential 
regulation of the offshore oil drilling industry.108  Judge Torruella, 
authoring the lead opinion, held the investment-backed expectations in 
Monsanto dispositive only due to an express statutory promise of 
confidentiality.109  Thus, over a blistering concurrence,110 the lead opinion 
found the forced public disclosure of cigarette ingredients a taking only 
after analyzing the other two Penn Central factors.111  It held the statute 
unconstitutional due chiefly to the character of the government action.112  
Thus, the lead opinion would find, where no express promise of 
confidentiality exists, a forced disclosure of trade secrets constitutional – 
even when challenged ex ante – if frustration of investment-backed 
expectations is not total and the character of the government action is 
proper.113  The concurrence, by contrast, found the Massachusetts statute 
unconstitutional due solely to frustration of investment-backed 
expectations, finding that factor dispositive even without an express 
confidentiality guarantee.114 
                                                
language.  See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007; see also Pennzoil Co., 534 F.2d at 632 
(implying that the forced public disclosure of a trade secret was not invalid upon a proper 
agency demonstration of need, despite filing suit before submitting data); Superior Oil 
Co., 563 F.2d at 205 (implying a similar tenet as Pennzoil). 
 
108 See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 45-46. 
 
109 See id. at 33 n.5, 36, 38-39. 
 
110 Id. at 48-49 (Selya, J., concurring) (“[T]he lead opinion seems to assume that when 
Penn Central applies, stare decisis does not.”). 
 
111 See id. at 33-35 & 33 n.5. 
 
112 Id. at 44-45 (“If I was convinced that this regulation was tailored to promote health 
and was the best strategy to do so, I might reconsider our analysis. . . . [T]he character of 
the government action determines the case.”). 
 
113 See id.  
 
114 See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 48-49 (Selya, J., concurring). 
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[31] Potential offshore oil drilling regulations may drive a wedge 
between the Philip Morris opinions.115  The lead opinion held the cigarette 
ingredient disclosure statute invalid due to the character of the government 
action, specifically regarding doubts that indiscriminate public disclosure 
of all ingredients, dangerous or benign, served the purported government 
purpose of promoting health and safety.116  By contrast, regulation 
requiring public disclosure of data relating specifically to health, safety, 
and environmental hazards in offshore drilling would not suffer the same 
character-of-the-government-action infirmity.117  Many policy reasons 
support agency disclosure of data to the public.118  Outside scientific 
investigation is often the only way to ensure unbiased research targeting 
issues affecting health and safety.119  Furthermore, after the failure of the 
oil industry and regulatory agencies in the Gulf oil spill, Alaska, and 
elsewhere, the need for public disclosure is overwhelmingly great.120  
                                                
 
115 See id. at 45-46 (“The Disclosure Act causes the tobacco companies to lose their trade 
secrets, entirely, and appellants advance no convincing public policy rationale to justify 
the taking itself.”) (emphasis added). 
 
116 See id. 
 
117 See id. at 45 (suggesting the validity of a Minnesota statute requiring public disclosure 
only of specific dangerous cigarette additives); see also Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. 
Ostrom, 335 N.W.2d 596, 629-30 (Wis. 1983) (finding forced public disclosure a taking 
due to the character of the government action only because the regulation did not advance 
the governmental purpose). 
 
118 See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and 
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
837, 841-43 (1980) (arguing that agency confidentiality precludes peer review, hinders 
the ability to attract or develop top scientific talent within agencies, and causes bias in 
scientific evaluation and dangerous mistakes in approvals). 
 
119 See Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Three Harvard School of Public 
Health Alumni Named to New FDA Tobacco Advisory Committee (March 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/2010-releases/hsph-
alumni-named-to-new-fda-tobacco-advisory-committee.html (“‘The Harvard School of 
Public Health is in a unique role to contribute to FDA regulation of tobacco products, as 
we have one of the only research centers in the nation that has conducted and published 
extensive work on the design and addictiveness of the actual product.’” (quoting Gregory 
N. Connolly, Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee). 
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Thus, even if other courts were to follow the First Circuit’s lead, 
regulation requiring limited public disclosure of health, safety, and 
environmental data would properly serve a legitimate governmental 
purpose, and would likely be valid under Monsanto and Philip Morris, 
even when challenged ex ante.121 
 
V.  EXACTIONS DOCTRINE AND TRADE SECRETS 
 
[32] Further grounds exist for regulation mandating public disclosure of 
health, safety, and environmental data in offshore drilling: drilling 
companies lease the tracts of ocean land from the federal government.122  
Thus, even if regulation requiring public disclosure were held invalid 
when challenged ex ante, the government may be able to accomplish 
through contract or property what it could not by regulation.123  The 
contract for lease of a tract of ocean land could contain an express 
agreement to assign to the government the proprietary interest in any data 
specific to that locale.124 
 
                                                
120 See sources cited supra notes 3-6. 
 
121 See Stanley H. Abramson, Confidential Business Information Versus the Public’s 
Right to Disclosure—Biotechnology Renews the Challenge, 34 KAN. L. REV. 681, 699-
700 (1986) (proposing limited public access to proprietary health, safety, and 
environmental data in the biotech industry for a limited period, on EPA premises, and 
only by demonstrated non-competitors).  It would further appear that, in deepwater 
offshore drilling, where tremendous liability and public fallout can accrue through a 
mishap, regulated companies could perceive an “‘average reciprocity of advantage’” in 
being subject to transparent health, safety, and environmental regulation.  Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted); see Connelly, supra note 70, at 251–55 (urging Justice Rehnquist’s 
“average reciprocity of advantage” standard for evaluating takings of trade secrets, and 
using such to justify the Westinghouse decision (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
122 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2006); Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 627, 
629 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 
123 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332.  
 
124 See id. 
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[33] Examination of the mandatory public disclosure of proprietary 
health, safety, and environmental data through the lens of land use law 
reveals that regulating deepwater leaseholders’ exploitation of the mineral 
rights in their real property possibly implicates the exactions doctrine in a 
manner that regulation of foods,125 pesticides,126 and cigarettes127 does not.  
Subpart A of Part V attempts to extrapolate the Supreme Court’s prior 
exactions decisions to the possible avenues by which courts might extend 
exactions jurisprudence as it relates to the mandatory public disclosure of 
trade secrets.  It also argues that the arbitrary land-use criterion should not 
limit the exactions doctrine.  Rather the exactions doctrine should extend 
to the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets, at least in the adjudication 
context.  Subpart B explores the implications of exactions jurisprudence 
for conditioning the permitting of a leaseholder’s drilling and exploration 
activities upon the disclosure of proprietary data.  It then argues that most 
instances of mandatory public disclosure will satisfy the nexus and 
proportionality requirements of the exactions doctrine.  Subpart C explores 
the validity of the federal government expressly conditioning its leasing of 
the ocean subsoil and seabed upon a contractual obligation to publicly 
disclose health, safety, and environmental data.  Finally, Subpart D 
advances policy arguments for why the exactions doctrine, even if applied 
to deepwater drilling regulation mandating public disclosure, should not 
invalidate such regulation.  
 
A.  Extrapolation from Existing Exactions Decisions 
 
1.  Requirement of Land Use 
 
[34] Nollan and Dollan both involved conditioning the grant of land 
development permits upon a grant of an interest in that parcel of land, 
leading to the interpretation that the exactions doctrine only applies to 
doubly landed exactions.128  Yet there is nothing inherent limiting the 
                                                
125 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919). 
 
126 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). 
 
127 See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 
128 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987). 
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exactions doctrine to land development permits alone, nor to exactions of 
interests in land.129  The basic purpose of the exactions doctrine is to 
prevent the government from unfairly leveraging a petitioner’s chance 
need of a permit as a pretext to extract constitutionally protected property 
without compensation.130  The exactions policy furthers a principal 
purpose of the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which is “to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”131  All that is required, in theory, to implicate the exactions 
doctrine’s underlying policy is that the government exaction demand 
property protected under the Takings Clause.132  This includes any 
property that the government is without constitutional authority to 
confiscate without compensation.133   
 
[35] Four prototypical scenarios present themselves as potential 
candidates for being subject to the exactions doctrine.134  These scenarios 
represent the possible combinations of the two basic “landedness” factors 
of potential exactions: whether the permitting petition is to improve land, 
and whether the exaction the government demanded in exchange is of an 
                                                
129 Neither Dolan nor Nollan contains language expressly limiting the exactions doctrine 
to land development permits or land interests.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91; Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 834-37; see also Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003 (stating that the Supreme Court 
has found intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Takings Clause). 
 
130 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (“‘The distinction, therefore, which must be made between 
an appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain 
is whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which 
the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property 
simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some 
license or permit.’” (quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 
1980)). 
 
131 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 
132 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-84, 388-91. 
 
133 See id.  
 
134 See id.  
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interest in land.135  Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, four scenarios are 
possible:  (1) the requested permit is for development of land the petitioner 
owns,136 and the exaction is for an interest in land (both “landed”);  (2) the 
permit is not for land development but the exaction is for an interest in 
land (one “landed”); (3) the permit is to develop land the petitioner owns 
but the exaction is for Takings-Clause-protected property other than land 
(one “landed”); and (4) neither the permit is for land development nor is 
the exaction for an interest in land (neither “landed”).137  As noted, Nollan 
and Dolan involved the first scenario, in which both the petition and the 
exaction involved the petitioner’s land.138  Monsanto, by contrast, 
involved the fourth scenario, in which neither the requested permit – to 
market pesticides – nor the exaction the government demanded – public 
disclosure of trade secrets – concerned land.139 
 
                                                
135 See id. at 386-88. 
 
136 See id. at 377 (stating that the petitioner challenged the approval of a building permit, 
where such approval was conditioned “on the dedication of a portion of her property for 
flood control and traffic improvements”). 
 
137 See id. at 383-84, 388–91. 
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138 See id. at 377; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
 
139 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984).  Note that the trade 
secrets in Monsanto did constitute property protected by the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.  Id. at 1003-04.  
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[36] The Supreme Court decided Monsanto before Nollan, and the 
Court did not explicitly analyze the case through the exactions doctrine.140  
Nonetheless, courts conceivably could apply the exactions doctrine and its 
requirements of essential nexus and rough proportionality to any of the 
above four types of scenarios.141  It is likely that courts will at the very 
least limit the doctrine to interests marginally related to land, for both 
policy and political reasons.142  However, courts should extend application 
of the exactions doctrine to non-land-use scenarios.  As previously noted, 
there is no inherent distinction between land use and non-land use for 
purposes of exactions.143  If the exactions doctrine is in fact a logical 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and its policies 
sound, then its logic should not be artificially cabined by the arbitrary 
criterion of land use.  The doctrine should thus apply in cases of trade 
                                                
140 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-05. 
 
141 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:  NATURE, 
LAW, AND SOCIETY 905 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that “‘no rigid rules’ or ‘set formula’ are 
available to determine where [valid] regulation ends and [invalid] taking begins” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
142 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (describing the context 
in which the exactions doctrine applies as the “special context of land-use exactions”); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (“[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property 
rights through the police power as a ‘substantial advanc[ing]’ of a legitimate state 
interest.  We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in 
that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.”); PLATER ET AL., supra note 
141, at 900-01, 929 (describing the intense political machinations motivating takings 
disputes and alluding to the effect and power of “property rights advocates” in advancing 
the Nollan and Dolan cases to the Supreme Court).  The Supreme Court has already taken 
a step to limit the application of the exactions doctrine, declining to apply it to challenged 
regulatory actions not involving the conditioning of a permit grant upon exactions and 
emphasizing its special context of land-use.  See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 
687, 702 (1999) (“Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the 
Takings Clause, we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the 
special context of exactions–land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on 
the dedication of property to public use.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
143 See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. 
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secret takings, such as Monsanto.144  Nevertheless, in situations where the 
exaction is the disclosure of health, safety, and environmental impact data, 
the essential nexus and proportionality requirements of the exactions 
doctrine are usually satisfied.  Thus, the exactions doctrine, while 
applicable to situations involving deepwater drilling, will only work at the 
margins. 
 
2.  Legislative Versus Adjudicatory Action 
 
[37] As noted in Part II, there is ample basis for cabining the exactions 
doctrine to individualized adjudicatory actions.145  The Supreme Court in 
Nollan and Dolan emphasized the adjudicatory nature of the agency 
actions struck down in those cases, and subsequent Supreme Court cases 
have emphasized this seemingly essential element.146  Furthermore, 
exactions jurisprudence is itself a special application of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.147  As the Court explained in Dolan, the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the special context of exactions 
provides that the government may not require a person to forfeit a 
constitutional right – the right to not have property confiscated – in 
exchange for a “discretionary benefit conferred by the government” where 
the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.148  By labeling the 
exchanged-for government benefit as “discretionary,” the Court implies an 
individualized adjudicatory action, not a purely legislative rule applying 
broadly and equally, without distinction, to an entire class of parties.149 
                                                
144 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-07. 
 
145 See supra Part II. 
 
146 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (characterizing the holding in Dolan as applying to 
adjudicative action); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 
147 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
 
148 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. 
 
149 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (distinguishing individual adjudication 
from general legislation based on the effect on individuals rather than the broad class); 
Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“First, 
adjudications resolve disputes among specific individuals in specific cases, whereas 
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3.  Application to Deepwater Oil Drilling 
 
[38] The land-use aspects of deepwater oil drilling might significantly 
affect the application of the exactions doctrine.  Depending on the 
situation, such drilling may or may not involve land use.150  Specifically, if 
the government were to condition the granting of a drilling and 
exploration permit for land already leased by the drilling company on an 
exaction of trade secrets, this would be an example of the third scenario 
previously identified – the permit is for land use development but the 
exaction is for property other than land.151  By contrast, if the government 
were to condition the ocean-land leases on an express contractual 
obligation upon the lessee to publicly disclose health, safety, and 
environmental information, it would likely be an example of the fourth 
scenario, in which neither the requested permit nor the exaction relate to 
land the petitioner already owns.152 
                                                
rulemaking affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals.  Second, 
because adjudications involve concrete disputes, they have an immediate effect on 
specific individuals (those involved in the dispute).  Rulemaking, in contrast, is 
prospective, and has a definitive effect on individuals only after the rule subsequently is 
applied.”) (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 
150 See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sw. Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315 (1956). 
 
151 See supra para. 35. 
 
152 Note that postregulation acquisition, though ordinarily irrelevant to Penn Central 
takings and exactions analysis, is material in this unique situation of leasing federal lands.  
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616, 630 (2001) (holding that 
postregulation acquisition is not a bar to Penn Central takings claims); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff’s rights were not 
altered by having acquired the property after the government’s public announcement of 
its intention to condition permits on the transfer of easements, because the plaintiff 
acquired the full property rights of the prior owner of the property).  Unlike in Palazzolo 
and Nollan, where title and all legal claims were transferred from the prior landowner to 
the plaintiff, here, the government is itself the prior owner and lessor of the ocean land.  
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.  Governmental declarations 
of leasing conditions on ocean land may not be viewed logically as diminishing the 
government’s own interest as landowner, and thus no conveyable legal right to challenge 
the regulation exists here.  See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.  
This then is that unique circumstance where Justice Brennan’s dissent in Nollan speaks 
for the majority as well, where the title taker by postregulation acquisition is indeed on 
notice of the conditions upon the property.  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., 
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[39] The form of potential deepwater drilling regulation – whether 
legislative or adjudicatory – will also significantly affect the application of 
the exactions doctrine.  Regulation crafted in purely legislative form 
would likely avoid the exactions doctrine entirely.  Thus, a statute or 
agency rule that provides – in a manner requiring little interpretation – that 
all applicants for drilling and exploration must, as a class, publicly 
disclose certain specified data, such as the geological composition and 
structure of a drilling area, or the volume, pressure, location, and 
composition of oil reserves drilled, would likely not be evaluated under 
the exactions doctrine.  By contrast, a rule or statute carrying a more 
general mandate – e.g., the disclosure of information critical to health, 
safety, and the environment – would require further agency interpretation 
and tailoring to individual drillers in its application within licensing 
proceedings.  Such disclosure requirements would tend more toward 
adjudication and would, at least in this respect, fall within the ambit of 
exactions jurisprudence. 
 
B.  Conditioning a Permit to Explore and Drill on  
Proprietary Data Disclosure 
 
[40] It is possible to reread the Monsanto decision in light of, and 
consistent with, the subsequent Nollan decision and to hold the exactions 
doctrine applicable to the Monsanto situation.153  In Nollan, the Court 
stated that the taking of property, which would otherwise undoubtedly be 
unconstitutional, is valid when attached to a development permit and when 
satisfying the exactions doctrine.154  Monsanto may be read to say just the 
                                                
dissenting) (arguing that, at the time of purchasing the new developments, Nollan was 
“on notice that new developments would be approved only if provisions were made for 
lateral beach access”). 
 
153 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984). 
 
154 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (“Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent 
grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were 
not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid 
construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely 
include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a 
concession of property rights, that serves the same end.”). 
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same, that (except during the years of the express statutory promise of 
confidentiality) Monsanto was forced to convey valuable property as a 
proper exercise of the EPA’s valid authority to outright prohibit the sale of 
Monsanto’s pesticides, and that the requirements of essential nexus and 
rough proportionality between such mandatory disclosure and the purpose 
of such prohibition were satisfied.155  In other words, the Court may have 
been applying the nascent exactions doctrine to that case – though an 
example of the fourth scenario of non-land use – without saying as 
much.156 
 
[41] In the case of deepwater oil drilling, the permit to explore and drill 
is actually a land use restriction, an example of the third exaction scenario 
previously identified.157  If the exactions doctrine should be read to apply 
in Monsanto and is to be applied in similar cases, such as the marketing of 
food158 and cigarettes,159 then a fortiori it must be adhered to in land use 
regulation such as oil drilling.  If courts apply the exactions doctrine to the 
case of regulatory agencies conditioning the grant of a permit to drill and 
explore upon the public disclosure of health, safety, and environmental 
data, two requirements must be met.160  First, the agency must possess the 
authority to prohibit drilling and exploring outright.161  Second, the 
probable impacts of the proposed drilling and exploration would need to 
be compared to the benefits of the public disclosure of such data and 
evaluated for an essential nexus as well as rough proportionality.162 
                                                
155 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 391 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; 
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1004. 
 
156 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-05; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. 
at 836-37. 
 
157 See supra para. 35.  
 
158 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919). 
 
159 See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 
160 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
 
161 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
 
162 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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[42] The relevant agency, the Mineral Management Service (“MMS”), 
most likely possesses the authority to prohibit drilling and exploration 
outright, pursuant to its statutory mandate to prevent negative impacts on 
safety and the environment.163  Furthermore, the MMS could likely 
establish an essential nexus between the impacts of the proposed drilling 
and exploration and the required exaction of disclosing proprietary health, 
safety, and environmental information to the public.164  As previously 
mentioned, public disclosure possesses many benefits that aid in effective 
oversight of health, safety, and environmental risk mitigation.165  
However, the unknown nature of the impacts of the proposed drilling 
might complicate this essential nexus.  Thus, it is merely the suspected 
impacts that share a nexus with such public disclosure.  Nonetheless, there 
is probably a significant enough risk of public harm in all cases of drilling 
and exploration to satisfy the nexus requirement.166 
 
[43] The closer call would probably be the rough proportionality 
requirement.167  As the Supreme Court made clear in Dolan, no 
mathematical precision is necessary in evaluating this proportionality.168  
                                                
163 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)-(4) (2006) (naming the outer Continental Shelf a vital 
national resource held by the Federal Government for the public and declaring it the 
policy of the United States to protect coastal and non-coastal areas from negative impacts 
of exploration and drilling on marine, coastal, and human environments); § 1351(a)-(c) 
(requiring the submission of a development and production plan to the Secretary before 
undertaking any development and production and detailing safety and environmental 
safeguards); 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.201 to 250.202 (2010) (detailing the plans and information 
that must be submitted before conducting any activities on an outer Continental Shelf 
lease). 
 
164 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
 
165 See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 841-43. 
 
166 See § 1332(4) (“[E]xploration, development, and production of the minerals of the 
outer Continental Shelf will have significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of 
the coastal States, and on other affected States.”) (emphasis added).  This would appear 
to amount to a Congressional finding of significant impacts in all cases of exploration, 
development, and production.  See id. 
 
167 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 
168 See id.  
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 4 
 35 
Nevertheless, there must be findings of the potential impacts of the drilling 
and the benefits of public disclosure, and an evaluation of their 
proportionality.169  How to reach these findings and weigh them against 
one another is a matter open to question.170   
 
[44] If evaluated from a numerical perspective, the difficulty is that the 
impacts of drilling and exploring seabed and subsoil of an undisclosed 
nature are unknown.171  Shall the MMS predict the expected value of 
unknown impacts based simply on the location of the lease and nothing 
more?  It is probably not an overstatement to say that any relation such an 
estimation has to reality would be by mere chance.  Perhaps a solution is 
that the MMS could require the disclosure in confidentiality of all relevant 
health, safety, and environmental data, and using that confidential 
information make a finding as to the likely impacts of the proposed 
drilling and exploration.172  Whether the MMS must distill those impacts 
into dollar amounts is unresolved.173 
 
                                                
169 See id.  Note that the proportionality requirement is not between the financial burden 
upon the petitioner of extinguishing trade secrets and the impacts of the proposed drilling 
and exploration.  See id.  The financial burden upon the petitioner is not a factor in the 
reasoning laid out in Dolan.  See id. (noting that the proper inquiry is the relationship in 
nature and extent between the impact of the proposed development and the benefits of the 
required dedication).  The relevant constitutional consideration, rather, is whether the 
exacted dedication functions as a substitute for the outright prohibition of the petitioned-
for development, both in nature and extent.  See id.  See generally Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
836-37.  It would nonetheless be interesting to consider whether an exorbitant exactions 
requirement upon the petitioner, in the presence of less expensive alternatives, would run 
afoul of substantive due process requirements. 
 
170 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development.”). 
 
171 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 
172 See supra para. 21.  
 
173 See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (making no mention of using the dollar amount 
of impacts in the constitutional calculus).  
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[45] The benefits of the exaction – public disclosure of health, safety, 
and environmental information – are similarly difficult to quantify.174  
Public disclosure improves agency decision-making, removes industry 
bias, and opens up to peer review the scientific inquiry into impacts and 
mitigation techniques.175  It also adds transparency, prodding regulators 
toward diligent oversight and providing a deterrent against ignoring their 
duty.176  What is the monetary or other value of this improved oversight, 
in a quantitative sense?177  The temptation to suggest a low amount based 
on the uncertain gain is tempered in this instance by the myriad 
preventable damages resulting from the Deepwater Horizon blowout: 
human health harms with unknown future consequences for affected 
persons in coastal states, especially as a result of dispersants used; entire 
economies of fishing, boating and tourism destroyed, at least temporarily; 
ecosystems devastated for an unknown number of years into the future.178  
The only thing almost certain in this situation is that quantitative findings 
will be heavily dependent on who is making the finding.179  The number of 
externalized costs swept into the calculation, or overlooked, will likely 
determine the existence or lack thereof of a rough proportionality between 
the likely impacts and the benefits of the exaction.180 
 
                                                
 
174 See id. at 385-86.  
 
175 See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 841-43. 
 
176 See id. at  843-44. 
 
177 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 
178 Your Maritime Lawyer, Oil Spill Commission’s Final Report Finds Deepwater 
Horizon Disaster Was Preventable, Urges Critical Industry And Government Reforms, 
GULF COAST MAR. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.gulfcoastmaritime.com/weeklyspotlight/ 
oil-spill-commissions-final-report-finds-deepwater-horizon-disaster-was-preventable-
urges-critical-industry-and-government-reforms/2386/. 
 
179 See generally The Use -- and Misuse -- of Statistics: How and Why Numbers Are So 
Easily Manipulated, U. PA. (Apr. 2, 2008), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=1928 (explaining some examples of statistical fallacies). 
 
180 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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[46] However, there is sound reason in the proposition that, because the 
exaction in this case is specifically to disclose information bearing on the 
risks of the proposed drilling and exploration, there is an inherent 
qualitative, definitional proportionality in such a comparison.181  The 
proportionality requirement is between the burden the regulated activity 
places upon society on the one hand, and the benefit that the exaction will 
bring society on the other.182  In the case of deepwater drilling, the MMS 
need only disclose the information necessary to determine the risks of 
drilling; thus the benefit of society’s possessing health, safety, and 
environmental information is conceptually identical to the severity of 
those same risks.183  This identity of scope should be sufficient to satisfy 
the Dolan Court’s language and intent, that “[n]o precise mathematical 
calculation is required,” only individualized findings indicating a rough 
proportionality.184  Thus, courts should indeed find the requisite rough 
proportionality in such a mandatory public disclosure, either through a 
finding of comparable values of benefits and impacts, or through a logical 
syllogism inherent in the majority of such mandatory disclosures.185 
 
C.  Lease Containing Express Contractual Provision for Data Disclosure 
 
[47] If the government were to condition the lease of tracts of ocean 
land upon the disclosure of any health, safety, and environmental data, it 
                                                
 
181 See id.  
 
182 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 
183 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  The difficulty with this reasoning is that an alternative to 
public disclosure exists – though arguably less effective – in the form of confidential 
disclosure to the agency.  See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118.  Thus, we might be 
confronted with the question, when evaluating proportionality, of whether to weigh the 
benefit of the exaction relative to available alternative exactions, or to weigh the 
exaction’s benefit with respect to a baseline of inaction.  See supra note 169.  Precedent 
might resolve this question, however, as the Court in Dolan did not seem to require 
consideration of other feasible alternatives in evaluating proportionality.  See 512 U.S. at 
388-91.  Dolan merely required that the exaction substitute for an outright prohibition, 
both in nature and extent.  See id. 
 
184 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 
185 See id.  
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appears exceptionally unlikely that courts would find the exactions 
doctrine implicated.186  This is the scenario most similar to Monsanto, in 
which the Supreme Court appeared to evaluate the trade secret takings 
question simply from a regulatory takings standpoint.187  Nonetheless, it is 
possible to read that decision in light of the exactions doctrine later 
expounded in Nollan and Dolan.188 
 
[48] If the exactions doctrine is applicable to the Monsanto decision 
(and it should be), then the doctrine also finds application in the case of 
deepwater drilling with a land lease expressly conditioned upon the 
forfeiture of trade secrets.189  The government would need to show the 
ability to prohibit the leasing of the property outright, and the essential 
nexus and rough proportionality requirements would need to be met.190  
While in the case of deepwater drilling the essential nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements would likely be satisfied, it appears unlikely 
that courts would extend the exactions doctrine to such a scenario 
unrelated to land use.191 
 
D.  Policy Arguments 
 
[49] The exactions doctrine, though applicable, should not inhibit the 
disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data.  The Supreme Court 
in Nollan and Dolan declared that exactions in land-use carry the risk of 
being merely a pretext to avoid the compensation requirement of a valid 
exercise of eminent domain.192  In the case of potential regulation 
                                                
 
186 See id. at 388-91; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). 
 
187 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984). 
 
188 See supra paras. 40-41. 
 
189 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 
1003-05. 
 
190 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
 
191 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
 
192 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
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requiring the disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data relating 
to proposed deepwater drilling and exploration, little possible pretext 
exists.193  To the contrary, the public would simply want reasonable 
assurance of safety from the very risks the drilling threatens.194  Where the 
demanded exaction of property is solely to mitigate the risks that the 
property holder is causing, a court should find the requirements of the 
exactions doctrine satisfied.195 
 
[50] Furthermore, the exactions doctrine, like the takings doctrine, 
functions “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”196  In the case of mandatory disclosure of health, 
safety, and environmental information related to proposed deepwater 
drilling and exploration, there is no public burden that an individual or 
group is forced to bear.197  The only burden existing in such a case is the 
need to ensure the safety of the petitioner’s own plan to drill and explore; 
the need for the proprietary data is merely to safeguard from the impacts 
of that drilling.198  For this reason, the exactions doctrine should not bar 
such regulation.199 
                                                
193 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 
194 Although exceptional circumstances might raise the possibility of an ulterior motive 
for the public’s desire for oil-drilling proprietary information (such as the energy crisis of 
the 1970s, during which Congress and agencies demanded proprietary natural gas 
reserves data to determine domestic energy supplies), the norm for wanting health, safety, 
and environmental data is not such.  Just as the Supreme Court cabined the exactions 
doctrine to adjudication – though in exceptional circumstances a legislative rule could 
also implicate concerns of pretext – a rule should not be fashioned from the exception 
here.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 
195 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. 
 
196 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
197 See id.  
 
198 See id.  
 
199 See id.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[51] Congress and the relevant agencies could likely design regulation 
requiring offshore drilling interests to reveal information necessary for 
ensuring public safety and preventing unreasonable health or 
environmental risks.  Mandatory confidential submission to government 
agencies is undoubtedly valid.  Limited public disclosure is also 
constitutional, though uncertainty exists as to the application of the 
exactions doctrine to trade secrets: the possible streams of analysis by 
which courts may measure such regulation have been explicated, and 
suggestions made.  It is hoped that these streams may offer some guidance 
to Congress and the relevant agencies in forging a legal path for effective 
regulation of deepwater drilling, and to the courts sitting in review.  
 
